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INTRODUCTION 
In the Lebanese political maze, the army has played an important 
role in supporting the legitimacy of the ruling establishment, particularly 
between 1958 and 1970 when the country was governed by Presidents 
Fucad Shihâb and Snarl Hilü. Historically, Lebanon's ruling oligarchies 
pursued the goal of preserving the established political and economic in-
terests by holding on to the unwritten National Pact of 1943, as well as 
the outdated Constitution and parliamentary divisions in place. Suc-
cessive Presidents, including Franjiyah, Sarkis and Al-Jumayyil con-
tinued to pursue this goal and rejected any attempts at compromise of a 
new dimension. Throughout the past ten years, successive challenges to 
the stability of the Lebanese Republic have been carefully engineered by 
both Christian and Muslim leaders to uphold these goals and objectives. 
The army, traditionally the single most apolitical institution in Lebanon, 
has been caught in the middle of the country's constitutional quarrels, 
and has recorded several significant challenges and threats to its unity. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the recent history of the 
Lebanese army and assess its future capabilities in light of existing and 
growing challenges emanating from Christian and Muslim militias as 
well as regional powers. What are the capabilities of the new Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF)? Are there sources of threats which may be iden-
tified? How is the new leadership likely to respond to these threats? 
Ultimately, the question must be raised regarding the future of the 
Lebanon and its military establishment. Can the country unite once 
again in the absence of a strong centralized force with a popular mandate 
to uphold law and order? 
ROLE OF THE ARMY WITHIN LEBANON'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
In the context of the Lebanese political formula, power is granted to 
the executive branch according to the Constitution of 19261 and the un-
written National Pact of 1943,2 while the legislative and judicial branches 
are called upon to "share" governing responsibilities. Lebanon's Con-
stitution does not include references to the military establishment, except 
in terms of the overall authority of the Commander-in-Chief, the Presi-
dent of the Republic, over the entire armed forces. Historically, 
however, Lebanon's military establishment has respected the Constitu-
tion and perceived its role as the upholder of law and order throughout 
the country. As a result, despite severe political crises throughout the Le-
vant, few military coup attempts have been recorded in the country. Col-
onel Joseph Bitar from the LAF, writing in 1973, defined the mission 
of the armed forces as being "limited to protecting the Lebanese 
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Constitution,"3 basing his remarks on the views of the founding fathers 
of independent Lebanon, including Presidents Bishära al-Khüri and 
Fucad Shihäb. In fact, President al-Khüri revealed in his memoirs that 
prior to his resignation in 1952, he "trusted" the Constitution to General 
Fucad Shihäb.4 Al-Khüri's successors reiterated their understanding that 
the army's ultimate loyalty was towards the Constitution which provided 
the Lebanese with specific rights and responsibilities.5 
Clearly, the "army constituted the principal support of the govern-
ment in Lebanon,"6 even though more often than not that support was 
based on inaction, which permitted the oligarchy to share power and 
"govern" the land. This inherent pattern of inaction on the part of the 
LAF was first manifested in 1952 and 1958, when the Commander of the 
Army, General Shihäb, refused to commit his troops against anti-ShamC-
ùnist forces, viewing the crisis as a contest over the personality of the 
President rather than a challenge to the State. In addition, Shihäb may 
have feared that any show of force against the anti-Shamcünists might 
threaten the cohesiveness of the army.7 Shihäb's motives must be analyz-
ed in terms of Lebanon's power-politics which, based on the 1943 
entente, promised to maintain a balance between the leading factions. In 
order to prevent any one group from claiming preferential authority, the 
army was foreseen as a "neutral force" capable of checking apparent or 
planned takeovers by any group or faction threatening the status quo. 
The "neutral army" gained considerable influence under Shihäb, whose 
intelligence service (Deuxième Bureau)' proved extremely capable in 
defusing a number of crises against successive regimes. While the tactics 
of the intelligence service may have terrorized large segments of the in-
telligentsia and while political freedoms may have been sharply reduced 
throughout the sixties, the Lebanese felt that their army was protecting 
them from foreign threats.' 
Clearly, the importance of the military as a source of influence in 
Lebanon, at least until 1970, cannot be overemphasized. The Lebanese 
Army, however, never played the role of a neutral force. It may be safe 
to state that the concept of an effective neutral force capable of exercis-
ing a balancing role is inapplicable to Lebanon, particularly when the ar-
my's defined mission is to uphold a constitution and a pact whose 
essence rejects the creation of a superior force which would maintain 
order among differing factions.10 Adel Freiha, in his major contribution 
on the "Army and the State in Lebanon," contends that, in 1958 at least, 
the army did indeed play such a role because it was "torn between its du-
ty to obey the orders of a civilian power whose legitimacy was contested 
and its ideal to belong to all the nation and thus remain an example of 
Lebanese compromise."" Given that choice, the army opted for the pro-
tection of the State as well as the people of Lebanon. It accomplished this 
by opposing its own government. While President Shihäb's motives are 
difficult to read, the army's overall weakness (its entire strength of bet-
ween five and six thousand vs. an estimated number of between ten and 
twelve thousand insurgents of whom possibly four thousand may have 
been non-Lebanese)12 should not have prevented it from using force in a 
successful manner. Indeed, the army had fared well when it was put to 
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the test. In 1958, the only battle between the army and the Junblattist 
forces occured near Kabr-Sharmil in the Shuf mountains where the 
Druze forces were attempting to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway and 
link with SaCib Salâm's forces through the Beirut International 
Airport." Despite this major success, however, Shihâb restrained his 
military machine, holding to his principal preoccupation of "keeping" 
his military establishment intact. He opposed a major attack against the 
Lebanese rebels, because he believed that if such an operation were at-
tempted, the religious differences in his forces—particularly the pro-
nounced sympathy of some of the Muslims for the rebel cause—would 
split them asunder. In effect, his army would "melt away."14 Other com-
mentators have suggested that Shihäb's non-intervention may have 
brought the disturbances to a rapid halt and that Shihâb is to be credited 
for displaying qualities of leadership.15 Noted Lebanese historian, Kamäl 
SalibF, wrote that 
Shihâb, by his policy of non-commital, had preserved 
the integrity of the Lebanese Army at a time when the 
rest of the Lebanese Republic was falling apart, [though 
he] found little appreciation among Christians. On 23 
September 1958, when Shihâb assumed power, only two 
institutions of the Republic stood intact: the Presidency 
... and the Army, thanks to the wisdom of Shihâb, and 
his refusal to involve his troops in the conflict.16 
Yet, despite the overall praise reserved to Shihâb for his sense of leader-
ship in 1958, his refusal to commit Lebanese troops to put down internal 
unrest may have placed the seeds of discontent among a number of fac-
tions whose political views did not coincide with those of the reform-
minded President. 
It is critical to note that at this stage in Lebanon's turbulent history, 
internal unrest in the country could not be blamed on the Palestinian 
guerrilla movements. The fundamental question was whether there 
would be room for everyone in Lebanon's political growth. Shihäb's 
rule, which focused on economic developments, failed to answer this 
question. In addition, while the powers of his intelligence service increas-
ed, the army was not strengthened to act as a deterrent against internal as 
well as external threats. When the opportunity existed to transform the 
LAF into a strong fighting machine, capable of sharply reducing sec-
tarianism within its ranks and turning the army into a national force, 
political considerations dominated Shihäb's views. This was, clearly, a 
lost chance. 
THE EARLY CHALLENGES AGAINST THE ARMY 
Between 1946 and 1975, the LAF had witnessed several challenges to 
their legitimizing role, emanating from pro-Syrian elements. It is impor-
tant to describe them briefly in order to reassert the point made above, 
namely that these warning signs should have compelled General Shihâb 
and his two successors to strengthen the Army. 
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In July 1949, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) or-
chestrated an attempted coup under the leadership of Antun Saadih.17 
SSNP forces attacked Hasbaya and Rashaya in Southern Lebanon and 
sought the assistance of Syria to help them topple the government of 
Bishâra al-Khurl and Riad al-Sulh. A political accord between the Sunni 
Prime Minister and Syrian President Husni Al Zaun led to Saadih's ar-
rest on July 8, 1949, after violent skirmishes in the village of Sarhamul 
between Lebanese gendarmes and SSNP militias. Saadih was sentenced 
to death on July 8 and excecuted the following day. Three years later, 
Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh was assassinated at the Amman airport in 
Jordan by an SSNP member who claimed to have perpetrated the act to 
avenge Saadih." 
In December 1961, the SSNP attempted a second armed revolt, but, 
once again, it failed to materialize despite the support of Lebanese Cap-
tain Fucad CAwad's armored battalion composed of eight to eighteen 
tanks. The coup attempt in Beirut came following the rupture of the 
United Arab Republic (between Egypt and Syria) and the September 28, 
1961, successful takeover in Damascus by Macmün Kuzbäri." In his 
zeal, cAwad arrested a number of high-ranking Lebanese officers, in-
cluding Hanna Sacid, the future Commander-in-Chief, and François 
Genadry, the future Commander of the Lebanese Military Academy. 
Other Lebanese military officers were arrested by SSNP militia forces, 
including Colonel Shmayat (Chef d'Etat Major), Colonel CAbd al-Kädir 
Shihâb, Commander Jalbüt (Sûreté Générale) and Colonel Naufal 
(Commander of the Gendarmerie).20 
Interestingly, several SSNP members, including former Syrian Ar-
my Commander Fadlallah Abu Marsun, may have alerted Colonel 
Antun Sacad, head of the Deuxième Bureau, of the party's plans in time 
for the LAF to defuse the coup plot. It seems, however, that the primary 
reasons why the coup failed were a lack of a concise ideological-
revolutionary spirit and extremely poor logistical preparations. Without 
any support from Damascus, the forty or so soldiers who were kept in 
the dark regarding the intentions of their hasty maneuvers, could not pull 
an upset victory. CAwad is said to have wanted to seize power for per-
sonal reasons, much more than cooperate with the SSNP. Clearly, this 
was no coup d'etat, but another in Lebanon's historic and numerous 
"coups de tête. "" 
Yet, the failed putsch demonstrated that the SSNP, at least, was in 
opposition to the position of the army and its power base. In response to 
these challenges, the army arrested seventeen thousand individuals 
believed to be sympathizers of the SSNP. A good deal of controversy ex-
ists regarding their treatment, which may have included torture. Suffice 
it to say that the treatment may have been severe, yet must be placed in 
the perspective of regional politico-military developments with Shihäb's 
rising power and the Deuxième Bureau's position in the Arab world." 
Finally, prior to the outbreak of the 1975 Civil War, an interesting, albeit 
bizarre, episode occurred which merits attention. 
In 1958, Colonel Fucad Lahüd attempted to contact several Syrian 
officers to "expediate" President Shannon's term in office and bring 
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Shihäb into power three weeks earlier than scheduled. Whether an actual 
coup was in the offing may never be known. What is clear, however, is 
that potentially the attempt may have been against Shihäb, orchestrated 
by pro-Syrian elements." Former President Shamcun supported Lahüd's 
claim that he did not collaborate with the Syrians against the state and 
had in fact managed, along with three hundred soldiers, to stop rebels 
assembled on the Syrian frontier who planned to attack MarjayCfln25 for 
three months. 
These developments in Lebanon's early history indicate that the ar-
my's legitimacy was challenged by pro-Syrian elements from within the 
country's polity. As a result, the army's perceived role as a "neutral 
force" could not but weaken it beyond any hope for an effective power 
base. Furthermore, during the early seventies, a strong anti-army feeling 
existed in the country. While opposition was targeted to the past abuse of 
the Deuxième Bureau, the army's intelligence services, LAF morale 
diminished considerably, especially when large segments within the in-
telligentsia were calling for the army to remain neutral and not obey 
President Franjiyah. The latter's anti-Palestinian attacks led to a further 
schism between supporters of the core Arab cause, and die-hard anti-
Palestinian Lebanese. 
THE 1975-76 CIVIL WAR AND 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE LAF 
Between 1973 and 1975, Lebanon witnessed unprecedented political 
turbulence which led to the first round of its on-going civil war.26 
During the 1975-76 Civil War, the question of sending in govern-
ment troops to reestablish order was at the center of the debate between 
Prime Minister Rash'id Karämi and Interior and Defense Minister 
ShamCün. Karämi did not favor an army intervention on the basis that 
the military, being dominated by Christian officers would side with the 
Christian militias against Muslim Lebanese and Palestinian forces. 
ShamCün, on the other hand, wanted to uphold the cental government's 
légal prerogatives and intervene in the fighting. These political 
maneuvers led to the army's disintegration and at least four clear items 
may be identified to justify this assertion. 
First, the army failed to impose "Lebanese" authority after its in-
tervention against the Saida demonstrations on February 26, 1975. 
Political prerogatives forced the LAF to withdraw from the southern 
Lebanese city on March 2, 1975. Second, the Franjiyah-appointed 
military government, led by Prime Minister Nur al-Din al-Rifai, a retired 
Sunni gendarmerie brigadier, was received with very strong political op-
position. The military government lasted three days, from April 23 to 26, 
1975. Third, on September 10, 1975, LAF Commander, General Iskan-
dar Ghanim, was dismissed from office following accusations that he 
was supporting Christian militias and extending valuable logistics 
assistance to them. Fourth, after bloody clashes between the Army and 
Muslim militias in the northern city of Tripoli, dissention within the 
ranks appeared around the first two weeks of October 1975. 
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These four identifiable factors exacerbated the army's disintegra-
tion. A decisive development in the process occurred on January 16, 1976 
when the Lebanese Air Force was called in by Defense Minister Shamcün 
to attack Palestinian and "leftist" forces in Damur where Shamcün 
himself was besieged. This action, more than any other, may have widen-
ed the gap within LAF ranks, leading Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib in the 
Biqac garrison to declare the creation of the Army of Arab Lebanon 
(AAL) on January 21, 1976. Al-Khatib and his AAL may have received 
extensive support from the Murabitün forces of Ibrahim Kulaylât (pro-
Nasirists) and by Libya." Interestingly, the young lieutenant's quest 
stressed the Arab identity of the army and hence of the country, which 
remains one of the most difficult questions that the Lebanese need to 
answer. Nevertheless, in response to this new coup de tête, President 
Franjiyah declared on national television (March 14, 1976), that he 
"wished to inform everyone of the identity of Lebanon, which is an 
Arab, sovereign, free and independent state."28 It may have been too lit-
tle, too late, for it seems that "rebel" forces did not believe him. In an 
attempt to avoid a total disintegration of the LAF, Brigadier General 
cAziz Ahdab, commander of the Beirut garrison, executed a coup de 
force on March 11, 1976 by seizing the radio and television stations and 
demanding that President Sulaymän Franjiyah resign within forty-eight 
hours. By this time, fifty percent of the army's 18,500 men had abandon-
ed their positions and either joined certain militias or gone home. Fran-
jiyah refused to resign and instead preferred to abandon his presidential 
palace at Bacabda and moved to Juniyah. Within the military, new 
groups emerged, including: 
1) the Vanguard of the Lebanese Army (pro-Syrian), 
led by Lt. Col. Fahim al-Hajj; 
2) the Army of Lebanon, under the command of Fucad 
Malik, supporting the Christian militias; and, 
3) the Army for the Defense of South Lebanon, under 
the command of Sacad Haddad. 
As the first round of the Civil War wound down, Lebanon's state 
army was in shambles. President Ilyäs Sarkis and Army Commander 
Victor Khüri faced a formidable challenge in their repeated attempts to 
reconstruct Lebanon by strengthening its legitimizing institutions. By 
this time, however, both Syria and Israel had tasted the "fruits of con-
quest" and intended to transform the Republic of Lebanon to their im-
age." 
On the Lebanese domestic scene, major definitional problems re-
mained unresolved. In 1978, after three years of civil war, the debate 
centered around whether the army and its commander were to remain 
neutral. During an interview with the respected Al-Hawadith magazine, 
Army Commander Victor Khüri revealed that the goal for the new army 
was to balance its composition fifty-fifty between Muslims and Chris-
tians without emphasizing ethnicity, and evaluated the divisions within 
the army ranks as inevitable after several years of civil war. Khüri went 
further to suggest that the upheaval in the country's values and 
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institutions led the army to bear the brunt of this upheaval.30 The new 
Commander took over in the spring of 1977, and started by evaluating 
the damage done to the military establishment before agreeing on plans 
to rebuild the army. 
Acknowledging that the legacy of the army was responsible for its 
decomposition, Khüri stated that the general command of the army was 
composed entirely of Christian elements,31 and that this Lebanese 
"phenomenon," added to the legacy of two years of war, prevented him 
from pardoning those officers who defected. An additional hurdle for 
Khüri was the fact that a number of Lebanese Army officers who col-
laborated with militias (both Christian and Muslim) had plundered or 
burned the barracks in areas under their control. 
An important development under Khüri was his selection of a new 
Chief of Staff. His choice was Colonel Munir Tarbiyah, a Druze officer, 
whose acceptance by officers in the General Command was something of 
a challenge. But the commander prevailed and set the course of 
rebuilding the army by creating new battalions throughout the country. 
A mixed camp at Al-Saliniyah was opened and a mixed military police 
battalion revived. Finally, the military academy at Fayadiyah and a 
number of other military facilities, were once again operational in and 
around Beirut. 
THE 1977-1978 REORGANIZATION 
The Lebanese Army's reorganization in 1977 and 1978 included 
three basic developments. First, with respect to officers and recruitment, 
a new order was issued on February 10, 1977, which gave career officers 
an opportunity to resign in exchange for generous financial compensa-
tions. This pilot program was to last for three months, but was later ex-
tended until December 31, 1977, with the hope of persuading a number 
of Maronite Colonels to resign their posts. Simultaneously, deserters, 
most of whom were from the ranks of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), 
were offered an opportunity to return while a new recruitment campaign 
was launched. The resounding success of this campaign led to the crea-
tion of an army of 23,000 by 1980. 
Second, punitive measures were taken against the principal leaders 
of the AAL, including Lieutenant Al-Khatib, who was arrested by the 
Arab Deterrent Force (read Syrian forces), and dismissed from the Ar-
my. Similarly, the LAF suspended Major Haddad's salary on February 
1, 1979, before expelling him on April 19, 1979, the day after he pro-
claimed the "State of Free Lebanon" in the southern border area under 
his and Israeli control. 
Third, a genuine institutional reform program was initiated on 
March 13, 1979 with the adoption of a New National Defense Law 
(NDL). The NDL intended to upgrade the military's command, 
reorganizing the LAF into eight brigades.32 
Before discussing the NDL, it is important to examine General 
Khüri's efforts in reorganizing the army in 1978, without which the 1979 
law would not have materialized. In December 1978, an effort was made 
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to base the new objectives of the reconstructed army on the following 
principles: 
1) Securing unity of command in a cohesive way; 
2) Reducing the number of subordinates under each 
commander in an effort to provide higher efficiency; 
3) Delegation of authority to subordinates in order to 
increase the effectiveness of the chain of command; 
4) Soundness of decision made by qualified officers in 
the echelon nearest to the problem; and, 
5) Unification of the appropriate activities and their 
coordination. 
Several steps were also taken to improve the army's staff organization, 
including the upgraded duties of the Chief of Staff whose authority ex-
tended over the directorates of training and legal affairs, as well as the 
two deputy Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the Chief of Staff was to super-
vise the implementation and co-ordination of staff activities for rapid 
fulfillment and auditing of the staff's work, in order to alleviate the duty 
load on the commander of the army." 
The most prominent characteristics of the 1978 proposals for re-
organization were the following: 
1) to relieve the Commander of the army of some of the 
heavy burdens of command and delegate them to the 
Chief of Staff and his four deputies; 
2) to initiate this delegation in order to improve the 
LAF decision-making process and assume speed, ef-
fectiveness and productivity; 
3) to create a cohesive and integral unit at the general 
command level, enabling it to achieve a single in-
tegrated function through a distribution of efforts 
and responsibilities; and 
4) to place the new army organization on the road to 
reconstruction with safe, stable, well-developed na-
tionalistic and military foundations.34 
These sound proposals, nevertheless, could not be implemented 
without political support. That support would, in fact, come in 1979 with 
the new Defense Law. But, it is important to note that given the enor-
mous pressures of the war and those caused by the Syrian-dominated 
ADF, these modest proposals were indeed major achievements. 
THE 1979 NEW DEFENSE LAW 
Under the NDL, six major reforms were introduced in the military 
with the purpose of alleviating some of the long-standing disputes. It is 
important to list them briefly in order to underscore the fact that prior to 
1982, a serious attempt was made in Beirut to set the course of reconcilia-
tion in Lebanon on the proper footing. The NDL was drawn up by the 
Parliamentary Formulating Committee, presumably representing the 
views of all factions in the Assembly. It was the first major post-civil war 
law which defined the country's critical defense policies. There are six 
important items in the NDL which require careful scrutiny. 
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First, the powers of the Chief of State are implicitly restricted 
despite the fact that the President exercises his prerogatives according to 
the provivisions of the Constitution. While Article 2 of the NDL states 
that "the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the 
armed forces," it also states that "He exercises these powers through the 
Council of Ministers and the Supreme Defense Council."15 This implies 
that the President must reach an agreement with the government on 
issues of national security. Before the NDL, the President enjoyed a free-
hand in devising and implementing national and international policies. 
Second, the government (Cabinet) and the Supreme Defense Coun-
cil are called upon to decide the country's defense policies and to define 
their aims (Articles 3, 5 and 6)." 
Third, the NDL created the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), con-
sisting of the President (Chairman), the Prime Minister (Vice Chairman), 
and the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Finance, as 
well as the Deputy Prime Minister, if available, as members (Article 7). 
In addition, the Commander of the Army takes part in SDC meetings in 
an advisory capacity, independent from the SDC's own Secretariat with 
specific functions (Articles 8, 9, 10)." The SDC Secretariat is responsible 
to the Prime Minister and must be headed by an active officer of the rank 
of Colonel or above. The Secretary General is charged with gathering in-
formation, preparing studies and plans for the SDC, conveying SDC 
decisions to competent bodies and following up on the implementation 
of the decisions (Article 9). 
Fourth, according to the NDL, the Minister of National Defense 
and all attached institutions — the Military Bureau, the Army, the 
General Administration Department, the Inspectorate General and the 
Military Council (Article 18) — are placed under the exclusive control of 
the Minister of Defense (Article 17).3* 
Fifth, the new military command is defined. The Commander of the 
Army will assume command and be seconded with a Chief of Staff who 
will be directly responsible to the Commander (Articles 22 and 23)." The 
Commander in Chief is appointed by cabinet decree from among the 
staff officers on the proposal of the Defense Minister.40 He has the rank 
of General and is directly responsible to the Defense Minister, who 
supervises him in the exercise of his duties except for military and securi-
ty operations, for which the Commander in Chief has sole responsibility. 
Sixth, the new law also set up a Military Council directly attached to 
the Minister of Defense (Articles 29 and 30).41 Its members are the Com-
mander of the Army, the Secretary General of the SDC, the General Ad-
ministration Director, the Inspector General and two officers with the 
rank of Colonel or above. By unwritten agreement, the council includes a 
member of each of the principle communities: Maronite, Sunni, ShiCa, 
Druze, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. Its duties, formerly carried 
out by the Commander in Chief, consist primarily of organizing the in-
stitutions attached to the Defense Ministry and naming the commands of 
the military regions, divisions, brigades, air force, navy and military 
academies, as well as the Military Attachés in embassy posts. 
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These major items in the NDL have undergone a series of "en-
durance tests" over the past few years with varied successes. One of the 
more interesting elements in the NDL is Article 82 which determines the 
retirement age for officers. Since the LAF suffers from a chronic abun-
dance of Maronite colonels, and since an attempt has been made in re-
cent years to reduce their numbers as a means of achieving a semblance 
of equality in the rank between Muslims and Christians, Article 82 of the 
NDL is rather significant. According to the NDL,42 retirement age in the 
Lebanese Army is as follows: 
Second Lieutenant 50 
First Lieutenant 51 
Captain 52 
Major 53 
Lieutenant Colonel 54 
Colonel 56 
Major General 59 
General 59 
Measures adopted by the parliamentary committee of the Lebanese 
Assembly were not received with éclat. In fact, the Chairman of the 
Parliamentary and Labor Committee, Deputy Nazim al-Qadiri (Sunni-
Western Biqac) warned against politicizing the debate over the military 
institution and said that "the military measures which General Khüri 
adopted [described above] are preventing development of the army in a 
national manner."43 In reality, however, opposition to the NDL was 
over the expected promotions which would occur under the proposed 
law. Indeed, several months later, eleven hundred officers, of whom 817 
were army officers, were promoted44 to the dismay of "rightist" 
leaders.45 Official reasons for granting the promotions included: 
"brilliant acts; carried out dangerous missions; and made exhausting ef-
forts to[ward] rebuilding and unifying the army."46 Sixty officers were 
promoted to full Colonel and ninety officers were promoted from the 
rank of Major to that of Lieutenant Colonel. This was perceived by 
"traditional leaders" as an invasion on the protected turf, leading Piyer 
Al-Jumayyil to declare that "it [would] be wise not to place the Lebanese 
and the foreigner on the same level of equality, nor absolute allegiance 
and the lack of allegiance."47 Since all officers were in fact Lebanese 
citizens, this vitriolic accusation was clearly directed against Muslim of-
ficers and politicians who had penetrated the army General Command, 
on the grounds that throughout the Civil War, many LAF officers had 
deserted and violated their oath of allegiance to the state. While this 
charge by the head of the Kata'ib Party is very accurate, it is applicable 
to both Muslim and Christian officers. More significantly, the promo-
tions were ill-advised particularly when very few LAF personnel, and cer-
tainly not eleven hundred, had distinguished themselves during the Civil 
War. Clearly, the political move produced a backlash with every political 
party voicing an opinion on what otherwise would have been routine 
military matters. The debate over these promotions and the NDL con-
tinued throughout 1979 and 1980. 
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On January 22,1981, a Presidential decree was promulgated concer-
ning the organization of the army. This move was intended to settle a 
long-standing political dispute over the Intelligence Bureau, which had 
until then been under the exclusive control of the army Commander-in-
Chief, and which the Muslim community had sought to place under the 
supervision of the Military Council. The new law stipulated that the In-
telligence Bureau is to answer directly to the Commander of the Army, 
but will provide the Chief of Staff with all the information available to it. 
As the Chief of Staff is traditionally a Druze, this compromise allowed 
the Muslim community to share in certain prerogatives formerly reserved 
to the Christians. In addition, the Intelligence Bureau would not be 
responsible for military rather than national security. In this way, it was 
hoped to reduce the influence of the Bureau, often accused of abusing its 
powers and meddling in domestic policies. 
These mesures did not allow the army to take over areas of Lebanon 
under Palestinian/Muslim militias' control,4* and more importantly, 
discouraged the army from conducting operations against militias. One 
such example was the hasty withdrawal of the army from the CAyn al-
Rumäni district of Beirut on October 31, 1980 following Kata'ib attacks 
on its positions. The last nail in the coffin was hammered in by the Syrian 
forces of the ADF, who refused to turn over their positions to the 
"reconstructed army." 
Against this background of events, Lebanon "experienced" the pro-
blems of 1982 when two modern armies (Syria and Israel) and the 
Palestinian forces transformed and further polarized the population. 
With the deployment of a Multinational Force composed of U.S., 
French and Italian troops, later to be reinforced by a small British unit, 
and the election of Amin Al-Jumayyil as President of the Republic, a 
fresh effort was made to reorganize the army and create a fighting force 
capable of defending the country from domestic unrest and foreign in-
terventions.4' Under the leadership of Amin Al-Jumayyil and with the 
assistance of the United States and several Western European states, the 
LAF underwent a major reorganization. It is to the present capabilities 
of the LAF that we turn next. What are those capabilities and what is the 
new philosophy governing the LAF? 
CAPABILITES OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES 
IN THE 1980s 
The capabilities of the LAF must first be evaluated in terms of the 
existing and expected leadership. Since General Shihäb, Lebanon has 
had no single, dominant military figure within the ranks of the LAF. 
Generals Hanna Sacid and Victor Khüri have had to deal with the 
presence of a strong foreign armed occupant in Lebanon which was not 
permitted to occur under Shihäb. Yet, both commanders were carrying 
political order from their government whose weak regional positions 
were further debilitated by successive accords and agreements negotiated 
in Cairo and Damascus, where Lebanon's domestic problems, more 
often than not, were not fully appreciated. 
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With the accession to "power" of Al-Jumayyil in 1982, General 
Ibrahim Tannüs was selected as the new Army Commander. Tannüs was 
perceived to represent the character of a resurgent army which will be 
called upon to rejuvenate Lebanon and project an image of confidence to 
the population. Al-Jumayyil and Tannüs succeeded in persuading the 
United States to assist Lebanon in re-creating its army. Under the 
Lebanese Army Modernization Program (LAMP), the United States 
committed itself to the rebirth of the LAF in late 1982. It was hoped that 
LAMP would succeed in accomplishing what had been tried since 1978 
but which had failed. Critical to LAMP training was the creation of 
leadership. According to U.S. Colonel Arthur Thomas Fintel, the officer 
in charge of LAMP in 1983, the disintegration of the Army in 1975 was 
due to a "lack of civilian leadership as [well as] the lack of military 
leadership."50 General Ibrahim Tannüs is reported to have filled a 
serious vacuum in Lebanon's military leadership by motivating his newly 
appointed brigade commanders and and delegating extensive powers to 
them. Conceivably, this was an indication of how the reorganization was 
functioning once again through an established chain of command. 
Parallel to this injection of leadership into the military, the LAMP com-
mander noted that a solid civilian leadership also existed with President 
Al-Jumayyil who was concerned about the future of the army and had a 
"good relationship" with General Tannüs." By early 1984, however, 
there was little evidence that the leadership had succeeded in winning the 
minds and hearts of weary and demoralized troops. This is a key aspect 
of the Lebanese Army's overall weakness which will be further discussed 
below. 
The second hurdle that the LAF had to cross in its re-creation was 
the acquisition of modern weapons capable of defeating the displayed 
strengths of the militias. In this respect, progress was more tangible. The 
year 1983 proved to be a logistic boon for LAF both in terms of equip-
ment and manpower. LAMP proved to be very successful and Colonel 
Fintel reported that the armed forces had progressed beyond all expecta-
tions." Over a very short period of time (late 1982 to mid-1983), the ar-
my exceeded all manpower projections and grew at the rate of ten per-
cent per month, even though the majority of volunteers and conscripts 
were coming from the militias. As a result of this surge, objectives were 
amended to include a 35,000 combat-ready army in twelve fully-trained 
brigades. In June 1983, the army counted fourteen thousand combat 
troops and ten thousand support soldiers, considerably larger than in any 
militia in the country. 
Originally, Beirut's goal was to rebuild the new army into several 
brigades, each composed of 2,400 men capable of growing to about 
3,900." The LAMP plan was to 
assemble the first four brigades at a strength level of 
2,400 men apiece, complete with equipment and ... do 
some work with the Beirut-sector [between December 
1982 and February 1983]. Then between February 1983 
and February 1984 ... put another brigade in, raise one 
to 100 percent and have four others at 70 percent with 
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the Beirut-sector troops. Then between February 1984 
and June 1985 ... bring on two more brigades at roughly 
70 to 80 percent strength, for a total of seven brigades at 
an average strength of 75 to 80 percent — 2,600 to 2,700 
men apiece.54 
Interestingly, the army had reached these objectives by June 1983, well 
ahead of LAMP'S planned schedule. 
As a result of these encouraging manpower increases, the Lebanese 
Army increased its objectives to 35,000 by the end of 1983, and decided 
to create an eighth ranger brigade which had achieved mid-strength by 
June 1983. Further, General Tannüs 
decided to form four additional light infantry brigades 
for a total of 12 brigades by the end of [1983], with a 
total strength of 27,000 men. This does not include the 
logistical support brigade, the combat support brigade, 
various regional and Army headquarters, schools and 
training centers — all of which, with 8,000 men, w[ould] 
bring the year-end total manpower strength up to 
35,000.55 
While this objective could easily be reached given the fact that there 
was no manpower shortage, the situation was greatly different logistical-
ly. LAMP-trained units were graduating faster than their equipment was 
reaching them. A good example was the 21st Battalion deployed in CAyn 
al-Miarisah. According the Fintel, the battalion, had "completed [its] 
training with the U.S. Special Forces, but the U.S. government ha[d] not 
yet been able to provide them with the equipment they need[ed] including 
the M-113s APCs," which would transform the battalion into a light in-
fantry outfit.5' Attention was devoted to training Lebanese Army 
mechanics at the large, yet overcrowded Badaro depot. 
Logistics complications arose with the variety of equipment which 
was transferred to Beirut. In recent years, Lebanon decided to purchase 
equipment from the United States, Britain and France, depending on the 
availability of foreign military credits. As a result, in 1983, Colonel Fucad 
cAun, LAMP staff coordinator, was forced to reorganize all LAF hard-
ware in separate units, with the French equipment in special battalions and 
the U.S. hardware in others. The new Kfarshima supply depot, which 
replaces the old facility at Barado, has been undergoing renovations and 
has catalogued close to 65,000 items to support the army.57 Nevertheless, 
the question remains whether constant refurbishments and uninterrupted 
supplies would be made available to the Lebanese Army, especially after 
the suspension of U.S. transfers in early 1984. 
LAMP training activities cover the full spectrum of military war-
fare, from conventional to urban fighting, although the major emphasis 
is on internal security and stability operations. Every soldier par-
ticipating in a LAMP unit receives four weeks of basic training prior to 
specialized exercises in urban and anti-terrorist operations. 
The U.S. military training program, according to Colonel Fintel, us-
ed the presence of the Marine Contingent deployed near Beirut as part of 
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the MNF, as example-setting units to demonstrate to Lebanese soldiers in 
concrete terms how a functioning unit should look.58 Whether the 
withdrawal of the Marines from the MNF will have a demoralizing effect 
on the remaining Lebanese armed forces, remains to be seen, of course. 
What is certain, however, is that the eighty or so U.S. Army training per-
sonnel (of whom fifty-three were Green Berets) deployed in Lebanon in 
June 1983 would have to reassess their activities, particularly following 
the U.S. decision to suspend military transfers." 
Particular attention has been devoted to equipping the army with 
105mm cannons which enjoy a high degree of firing precision. In addi-
tion, a new tank battalion with Jordanian M-48s has been assembled. 
Given the nature of Lebanon's terrain and the need to move a battalion 
of infantry rather rapidly, the army has relied on the Air Force to assem-
ble a helicopter wing able to accomplish the task. In June 1983, 
Lebanon's twenty-eight French and Italian-made helicopters (Pumas, 
Gazelles, Alouettes, and Augusta Bells) could lift a total of three hun-
dred men. This figure was projected to rise to between four hundred and 
six hundred with new airlift purchases which would bring the wing to for-
ty aircraft.60 The jet fighters of the Lebanese Air Force are less effective, 
given the sorry state of most of the equipment. Out of twenty-five jet air-
craft, eleven are trainers (five Fouga Magisters and six Bulldog pro-
pellers) with ten Mirages in mothballs requiring extensive repairs. 
Lebanon's ten Hunters were armed and operations, but suffered heavy 
losses in September 1983 during the Süq al-Gharb battles.61 The Hunters 
proved to be easy targets, with their age and relative slowness. 
Despite the shortage of modern weapons, Colonel Fintel of LAMP 
assessed the Lebanese soldiers' willingness to learn and their moral 
qualities by stating that he "would give them high grades in every area 
[willingness to learn, strength, courage, patience and discipline ... and] 
would be very happy to have Lebanese soldiers working under [his] com-
mand anywhere in the world."62 Comparing the Lebanese and Viet-
namese (Fintel served in Viet Nam for two years) soldier, the U.S. officer 
stated that "the difference between the Vietnamese soldier and the 
Lebanese soldier is a difference of about 500 years. With the Lebanese 
soldier, you are working with a man who lives, works and thinks in the 
20th century ... The young men here are modern young men — and I am 
talking about all [of them], from all over Lebanon, including the 
villages."63 
This positive assessment notwithstanding, the disintegration of the 
army in early 1984 indicated that training and modern equipment will on-
ly go so far in the rebirth of the Lebanese Army. It should come as no 
surprise that two years of LAMP training in Lebanon did not produce a 
cohesive fighting machine, capable of gaining the support of the warring 
factions. Encouraged by the presence of the MNF and the massive sup-
port of the U.S. Sixth Fleet stationed off the Lebanese coast, the LAF 
considered its options and chose boldly to deploy in the Shüf Mountains 
where Christian and Muslim militias were engaged in a series of battles. 
Additionally, the Army decided to enter West Beirut in force and 
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"clear" the capital's southern belt of its impoverished inhabitants. With 
the selective use of force, a new philosophy developed in Beirut, leading 
government officials to believe that its two recent tests illustrated how 
strong the LAF was. The challenges to the army, however, proved to be 
much more serious than anticipated. 
TH&CHALLENGES TO THE LEBANESE ARMY: 
THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THE DRUZE/CAMAL COALITION 
Through the late seventies and early eighties, Lebanon's Christian 
and Muslim militias gained in military as well as political strength. At 
present, the two most important groups which challenge the authority of 
the state and hence that of the army, are the Lebanese Forces and the 
Druze/c Amal coalition.64 Both deserve careful attention. 
The ascendency of the Lebanese Forces (LF) as a unified Christian 
military alternative to the central government in Beirut has dramatically 
altered the traditional political puzzle which is Lebanon. While the LF do 
not represent all Christians, they do enjoy a monopoly of sorts in the 
Mount Lebanon area. Simultaneously, Muslims in Lebanon, particularly 
among the Druze and Sunni communities, fear and distrust the Lebanese 
Forces, given the latter's very close ties to Israel, especially after the 
Sabra and Shatilla massacres where not only Palestinians but also 
Lebanese citizens were killed. Increasingly, the LF have become a force 
with which to reckon, with considerable financial and military support 
from Isreal. While initially the LF sought Israel's aid to "rid" Lebanon 
of the Palestinians and Syrians, and counted on the Jewish State to help 
them create a Christian State in Lebanon,65 they ended up with an oc-
cupation which will be in effect for the foreseeable future. 
Jonathan C. Randall reports how the relationship evolved between 
Bashir Al-Jumayyil and successive Israeli leaders, leading to the election 
of the head of the LF to the Presidency of Lebanon.66 It is important to 
add that the "regroupment" which took place among the numerous 
Christian militias in the early '80s was not a diplomatic achievement, but 
rather a succession of bloody feuds which scarred, perhaps permanently, 
the Lebanese political environment. In their effort to unify all right-wing 
militias, Bashir Al-Jumayyil and his Lebanese Forces attacked the 
Shamcunist forces, killing as many as five hundred of their fellow Chris-
tians, including many who were innocent bystanders.67 This victory over 
Shamcun came two years after the June 13, 1978 attack on Ehden and 
the assassination of Tony Franjiyah and his family.6' These actions 
meant that all Maronites, at least, would have little choice but to obey 
Bashir Al-Jumayyil, and by August 1980, the only Christian forces out-
side the control of the LF were the Franjiyah Marada in northern 
Lebanon, under Syrian tutelage. In a recent article on the Lebanese 
Forces, Lewis W. Snider suggests that the LF's "policy orientation and 
some of the activities of the Front suggest a Lebanese-centered view of 
Lebanon's problems, politics and approaches to post-war recovery, that 
potentially speaks to a much broader constituency than just to the Chris-
tians."6' But as long as elements within the Muslim communities con-
tinue to fear the LF, it is safe to assume that its primary constituency will 
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remain in the Christian enclave of Mount Lebanon. It is crucial to note 
that staunch pro-state identity of the Lebanese Forces cannot keep others 
from expressing similar nationalistic feelings. Prominent Muslim 
political figures are also capable of expressing, and do express, their 
patriotism. Therefore, the LF cannot enjoy a monopoly, at least not on 
their Lebanese-ness. While set up independently from the Katacib Party, 
the LF are its most dominant elements, and while it is accurate to state 
that the Al-Jumayyils do not dominate the LF and that their reliability is 
questionable,70 this point should not be stretched too far. Undeniably, 
the Al-Jumayyil family in 1984 is the leading political component of the 
Lebanese politico-military scene. 
By collecting taxes and imposing conscription in their enclave, the 
LF have attempted to create an alternative, legitimate structure to that of 
the government in Beirut. In addition, the LF have seriously jeopardized 
the authority of the Lebanese Army when it suited their purposes. 
Assuming that the Lebanese Army and Government eventually gain con-
trol over all of Lebanon, the fate of the militias will remain to be deter-
mined. Will they dismantle peacefully and turn over their considerable 
military equipment to a potentially strong central government? 
Undoubtedly, Christians and Mulsims living in LF controlled areas 
have enjoyed a modicum of public services not available in other parts of 
the country. Every attempt has been made to provide the population with 
needed services, even at very high prices. But it is clear that these social 
services could not be provided without the backing of a strong military 
establishment whose harsh punitive actions may in fact "ruin" anyone 
who steps out of line. In addition, many of these goods and services 
reach Lebanon through illegal importations, further eroding the 
legitimacy of the central government. 
Assuming that the Al-Jumayyil government could in fact secure the 
withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and succeed in restoring the 
government's authority over all parts of the country, it is difficult to 
predict whether the LF would relinquish its non-military organization. 
With respect to the LAF, the Lebanese Forces could conceivably become 
a competitor for recruits, and it is safe to assume that the Army would 
not tolerate this." While a potential military confrontation between the 
Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army may not be excluded, the more 
serious aspect of this contest is the support-base among Lebanon's Chris-
tians. In the absence of an element of trust towards the central govern-
ment, would the Lebanese Christians ever turn their backs on the 
Lebanese Forces? 
Extensive use of force against the Druze and the Shica populations 
of Lebanon by the Lebanese Army and its MNF backers, has created a 
severe polarization, leading Walid Junblatt and Nabih Berri to seek the 
assistance of Syria. Amin Al-Jumayyil's government placed itself in the 
opposition camp as far as the Druzes and Shicas were concerned follow-
ing the signing of the ill-advised May 17, 1983 Withdrawal Accord with 
Israel. In the absence of a concensus among all Lebanese factions, Al-
Jumayyil played his American card and lost." The Accord may have 
been an American foreign policy victory, but it did little to assist 
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Lebanon's political reconstruction. Opposition to the Accord grew 
steadily among Druze and ShiCa leaders who received additional support 
from Syria, all too anxious to profit from the opportunity to voice an 
opinion on Lebanese affairs and remind Beirut that the road to 
Lebanon's peaceful reconstruction passes through Damascus. 
Throughout the fall of 1983, the Lebanese Army was pitted against 
Druze forces in the Shüf Mountains and in and around Beirut against 
ShiCa forces. Early victories in November and December, led Shiite and 
Druze leaders to call on Muslim soldiers and officers to stop firing 
against their fellow citizens. In September 1983, eight hundred Druze 
soldiers deserted their command in Hammana and Bayt al-Dih, including 
the LAF Chief of Staff. 
By late January 1984, Beirut offered to reinstate and promote the 
Druze who had deserted the Army.73 While this action may have had a 
demoralizing effect on those troops who had remained loyal, President 
Al-Jumayyil had little choice but to agree to the reinstatement, given the 
fact that Beirut had already set a precedent by reinstating Major Sacad 
Haddad, after having tried him in absentia and dismissing him from the 
army. 
As the winter '84 showdown progressed, Shiite and Druze militias 
took control of West Beirut with "40 percent of the army's 27,000 active 
fighting men" having gone over to support the Muslim militias or refus-
ing to take part in any further fighting against them.74 These massive 
defections crippled the LAF as Washington's Lebanon policies were 
rapidly changing. The resulting ambivalence, both in Lebanon and the 
United States, increased the confidence of the Druze and ShiCa leaders, 
influencing them to demand major political changes, including the 
resignation of Al-Jumayyil. Calls for U.S. pressure on the Al-Jumayyil 
government increased. Daniel Pipes, for example, has suggested that the 
United States should use its military and economic aid as well as its 
diplomatic and moral support, to extract, from Beirut, some concrete 
steps in the reconciliation process. Presumably such steps would include 
"taking a new census, opening government offices to leaders of the op-
position forces, scrapping the six-to-five ratio of Christians to Muslims 
in Parliament, and holding new elections."75 Once implemented, these 
suggestions would conceivably pre-empt a Syrian take-over in areas 
north of the CAwali river and preserve the territorial integrity of 
Lebanon. Invariably, these suggestions include a hope for an ideal 
peaceful resolution of the Lebanese conflicts. Conversely, however, the 
logic behind these assumptions rests on the belief that all Lebanese, both 
Christians and Muslims are indeed willing to work for a united Lebanon. 
It is not impossible to assume that the Phalange Party controlling 
East Beirut and much of the Mount Lebanon region, would be satisfied 
by seceding from the Republic, should that solution guarantee the securi-
ty of the area and the population inhabiting it. The result of this poten-
tial occurence could undermine the President of the Republic, whether 
Amin Al-Jumayyil or another person, and deny the central authorities in 
Beirut any capacity to influence the course of events in the country. 
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President Al-Jumayyil's preferred position of increasing the strength of 
the LAF and uniting the public behind an institution whose legitimacy 
may be acquired fairly rapidly, may appear to offer a salutary avenue. In 
order to accomplish this, however, both Syria and Israel must refrain 
from interfering in the reconstruction of the LAF. 
CONCLUSION 
According to Paul Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, Damascus "view-
ed Lebanon as a member of the Eastern Front, and foresaw the creation 
of a Syrian-dominated LAF that could tie down the IDF (Israeli Defense 
Forces) in southern Lebanon." But following the 1978 Syrian assaults on 
Christian controlled territories, "the Syrians concluded that they would 
be unable to control the Lebanese Army, and consequently, had very am-
bivalent views about strengthening it."76 
Israel, in turn, opposed the return of the LAF to southern Lebanon, 
and ordered Major Haddad to attack two LAF army battalions attemp-
ting to deploy in the south, claiming that the LAF was dominated by the 
Syrians.77 Furthermore, while the army was capable of assuming posi-
tions evacuated by the Israeli army in the Shüf Mountains in 1983, the 
Israelis decided to turn over their positions to both Christian and Druze 
militias, thereby putting the Lebanese Army in its costly Shüf battles. 
The Lebanese Army's mission was to unite all factions in the coun-
try around its institutions by providing security for all and establishing 
Lebanese authority over all of the national territory. In late 1982 and ear-
ly 1983, the LAF proved capable of withstanding the enormous pressures 
exerted against it and "experienced no defection problems 
whatsoever."71 By the fall of 1983 and early 1984, however, forty percent 
of the army had deserted and most Muslim officers and soldiers refused 
to obey the orders issued by the Defense Ministry at Yarze. The root 
question here is that of loyalty. Why were not these soldiers loyal to the 
LAF? 
The question of loyalty is extremely important in this instance. 
Whether officers and soldiers in the Lebanese Army were loyal to the 
state or their immediate superiors will be debated for years to come. It is 
important to note that these defectors did not consider that the national 
government enjoyed genuine public support. Since military obedience is 
towards the law of the nation, the question must be raised of whether 
positive or natural law, or the law of the state, or the law of God applies 
in this case?7' The defections in Lebanon must be analyzed in terms of 
the will of each individual to pursue the dictates of his conscience, par-
ticularly when he perceives the state's partisan policies to favor one 
religious faction over another. 
In supporting the Constitution and preserving the National Pact, the 
Lebanese military attempted to lessen the chances of any violent change 
of government and to consolidate the traditional and constitutional 
transfer. This attitude was best exemplified by General Fucad Shihàb 
who considered himself a student of the Michel Shiha Constitutional 
School.80 Undoubtedly, the 1943 Pact reinforced confessionalism in the 
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country. More recently, a number of leaders have voiced their opinions 
regarding the future unification of the Lebanese people, and suggested 
that the means of achieving that stated goal would be to pursue laiciza-
tion. Cardinal Khoreiche (Maronite) had declared in 1977 that 
"democracy [in Lebanon] may be achieved through laicization" and the 
Greek-Catholic Council had adopted in 1976 a program which states that 
"laicization is the perfect means to unify the Lebanese and replace the 
motto 'Lebanon = compromise' with 'Lebanon = nation'."*1 
It is clear that as long as confessionalism is practiced in the country, 
it is impossible to expect the military or for that matter any other sub-
group in a society, not to be affected by it. Ironically, the recent 
resurgence of nationalism in Lebanon seems to have bypassed the Army. 
It remains to be seen whether a fresh commitment to the reconstruction 
of the LAF will be made. Both France and the United States have already 
invested considerable sums in the LAF,'2 and despite the freeze of its 
Lebanon policy, Washington continues to provide training assistance to 
the Lebanese Army." 
Despite this effort, past U.S. involvements, including the May 17 
Accord which permitted constant IDF presence in Lebanese territory,*4 
may have damaged the confidence of the LAF beyond repair. It remains 
to be determined whether Beirut can find an accommodation with both 
Muslim and Christian leaders to re-draft the National Defense Law per-
mitting the army to restore order throughout the country. A lesser effort 
would mean that the de facto partition of Lebanon will turn into a per-
manent reality. 
Cognizant of this threat, President Al-Jumayyil turned to the 
veteran Sunni politician from Tripoli, Prime Minister Rashfd Karâmi, to 
head a new government of national unity. Karâmi astutely proposed new 
reforms for the LAF and executed the first stage of his plan by replacing 
LAF Commander-in-Chief Tannüs with the more"neutral" Michel 
CAwn (Aoun).'5 In the second stage, the Prime Minister authorized 
cAwn to set up a six-member confessionally balanced committee man-
dated to end the fighting across factional lines. By early July 1984, the 
Lebanese capital experienced the long-awaited respite from the war as 
Druze, ShiCa and LF militia forces started to withdraw their heavy guns 
from the city and turn over key positions to LAF troops." Significantly, 
West Beirut was entrusted to the LAF's 6th Brigade (Muslim majority 
among the rank and file) and East Beirut to the Sth Brigade (Christian 
majority). The infamous Green line barricades were once again cleared 
leading Brigadier-General Muhammad al-Hajj to declare: "There is no 
longer East or West Beirut... It's now a United Lebanon with a united 
capital."*7 Yet, despite this show of optimism, two serious problems 
have arisen which require immediate attention. 
The first is the fate of several hundred missing individuals whose 
families took to the streets and delayed the government's unification 
plans. They demonstrated on the Green line and demanded an official in-
vestigation to determine the fate of their loved ones. A presidential com-
mittee was finally set up and is expected to expedite the release of those 
kidnapped prisoners who remain alive. Ironically, no more than two 
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hundred hostages may be accounted for, leading to speculation that this 
issue will return to haunt the government of national unity, as the 
number of those missing may be over fifteen hundred." The second im-
portant problem is the refusal of all militia forces to turn over their heavy 
guns to the army. Instead most of this arsenal was returned to mountain 
strongholds readily available for a future round of fighting if negotia-
tions on political issues are not resolved. Defense Minister cusayran is 
reported to have predicted that the LAF would indeed collect heavy guns 
from militia forces "in and around the capital city."" These assurances 
notwithstanding, it is amply clear that the LAF would have to pursue 
militia forces in the mountains in order to regain LAF authority 
throughout Lebanon. 
These recent developments indicate that the LAF's search for a new 
mandate cannot be completed as long as Lebanon lacks the political will 
to initiate genuine national unity talks. The accidental death of the LAF 
Chief of Staff Major-General Nadim Hakim, the highest-ranking Druze 
officer in the army, further enlarged the gulf separating the Druze com-
munity from the government of Amin Al-Jumayyil. While Hakim's 
death may have been mourned in the Shüf mountains, it went unnoticed 
in Mount Lebanon. Similarly, the death of Piyer Al-Jumayyil, despite 
eloquent statements, was largely scorned in the South. Tragically, con-
cern for "others" in Lebanon may have given way to a sense of restricted 
patriotism, creating a significant societal gap. Today, the LAF seems to 
be the prisoner of this limited environment, one which may only be ex-
panded with a resurgence of nationalism. 
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Table 1 — Lebanon: Armed Forces 
ARMY 
Troops and Officers: 
25,500 (Increased to 35,000 by the end of 1983) 
Equipment: 
Main Battle Tanks, M48 54 
Light Battle Tanks, AMX-13 13 
Armored Cars, Saladin 100 
Armored Personnel Carriers, M-113 400 
Other APCs, VAB 5 
Guns: 122mm 10 
155mm 36 
105mm how 18 
81/83mm, RPG-7, 85, 88 RI and 
RCL, 106mm 200 
Anti-Aircraft Guides Weapons, Milan 18 
TOW +. (several) 
Other guns, 20, 23, 30 towed mm, 
Zu-23, M-42,40mm SP AA ± (several) 
On Order, M-l 13 A2 APCs; 150 
155 mm how 12 
The army is divided into the following brigades: 
9 Infantry Brigades 
2 Artillery Brigades 
1 Mechanized Infantry Brigade 
1 Ranger Brigade (forming) 
NAVY 
Sailors and Officers: 250 
Equipment: 
Patrol Crafts, Large 1 
Patrol Crafts, Byblos Class Coastal 4 
AIR FORCE 
Pilots and Support Personnel: 1,250 
Equipment: 
1 Squadron with 8 Hunter F-70 (4 destroyed in September 
1983) 
1 Helicopter squadron with 11 Alouette II/III, 11 AB-212, 
6 Pumas and 4 Gazelles (with SS-11/ -12 ASM) 
Trainers: 6 Bulldogs and 5 Fouga Magisters 
Transports: 1 Dove, 1 Turbo-Commander 690A (on order 
6 Gazelles) 
Reserves (Requiring Extensive Repairs): 2 Hunter T-66, 
9 Mirage IIIEL, 1 Mirage IIIBL, 5 Alouettes and several 
R-530 AAM 
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